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Statement of Research Thesis
This paper evaluates the effect of surprises in economic data on stock prices. “Surprises
in economic data” refer to the difference between the forecast and initial release actual values
relative to the sample forecast error. The analysis addresses three questions. Do surprises in
economic data affect stock prices? If there is an effect, is the magnitude of that effect
symmetrical for positive and negative surprises? If surprises affect stock prices, how does market
forecast uncertainty affect the magnitude of the effect on stock prices?
Significance of Research Thesis
In theory, stock prices are determined by discounting future cash flows. The reality,
however, is more nuanced. While theory typically focuses on asset “fundamentals” (e.g.
dividends and growth for stocks), there are also many participants in financial markets who
speculate on potential market shocks and on short-term changes in prices. However, market
participants using both strategies confront the imperfections of real markets. Asymmetric
information and limited forecasting ability are among the greatest problems in real markets.
Studying how markets react to new information is worthwhile on three fronts. What
information do markets value? Are markets rational? What is the degree of efficiency in real
markets? Information valuable to markets is identified by a market reaction. A market
adjustment to new information implies that the information has significance in determining stock
prices. With regard to whether or not markets are rational, two examples of irrationality are
asymmetric market reactions to positive and negative shocks and exaggerated initial market
reactions. Efficiency refers to the immediacy with which markets adjust to incorporate new
information. This paper does not attempt to evaluate this aspect of markets.
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This paper focuses on market reactions to announcements of macroeconomic data.
Robust, regular data detailing both market expectations and the announced values are available
for nine key macroeconomic indicators: the consumer price index (CPI), nonfarm payroll
employment, industrial production (IP), ISM manufacturing (NAPM), real GDP growth, new
home sales, retail sales, personal consumption, and orders of durable goods. The data allow for a
measure of the surprise to be computed and regressed against a number of approximations for
stock prices.
Literature Review
Many papers address the link between economic news and stock prices. One of the
earliest, Waud (1970), concludes that stock prices react immediately to changes in the discount
rate. Although this study does not distinguish between expected and unexpected changes, it is
among the first quantitative studies to verify a link between stock prices and economic news.
Castanias (1979) takes a more focused look at this link and finds that the variance of
stock prices increases during trading days surrounding certain macroeconomic announcements.
This study is crude in that it uses only dummy variables to denote announcement days.
Nevertheless, Castanias (1979) offers support for the hypothesis that economic news affects
stock prices. This hypothesis originates from the theory that stock prices incorporate all relevant
information. Assuming macroeconomic news is relevant information and that it often differs
from expectations, macroeconomic releases should then affect stocks.
Pearce and Roley (1983) is one of the first studies to focus directly on the effects of
unanticipated economic news. They find that changes in money supply only affect stock prices
when their magnitude or direction is unanticipated. They also find that these market adjustments
are complete by the morning of the trading day after the announcement. The paper is limited by
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the fact that it only evaluates the market reaction to the money supply. In a subsequent paper,
Pearce and Roley (1985) broaden their scope to examine the effects of surprises in the money
stock, as well as the consumer price index (CPI), the producer price index (PPI), the
unemployment rate, industrial production, and the discount rate.
Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) examine the extent to which surprises in economic news
pose systematic risk to the market. They find that certain macroeconomic announcement
surprises influence expected stock returns. However, neither Pearce and Roley (1985) nor Chen,
Roll, and Ross (1986) standardize the surprises in economic data. Balduzzi, Elton, and Green
(2001) demonstrate that standardization is necessary to allow for direct comparison of the
magnitudes of the regression coefficients across different announcements. For example,
standardization allows for surprises in nonfarm payroll employment, which is measured in
thousands, to be compared to year-over-year (YoY) changes in the consumer price index (CPI),
which is reported in percentage terms. Furthermore, it allows for surprises in changes in the CPI
to be compared with the real annualized gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate. This is
significant because, though both measures of CPI and GDP are in percentage terms, the accuracy
with which they are forecasted vary significantly.
Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001) find that the releases of 17 macroeconomic variables
have a significant impact on certain assets in the bond market. Additionally, they find that bond
prices adjust within the first minute following an announcement. Trading volume and volatility
increase immediately and remain elevated for up to an hour. Although these findings relate to the
bond market rather than the stock market, they support the hypothesis that certain
macroeconomic announcements affect asset prices and that markets are perhaps efficient in their
response to new information.
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Gilbert, Scotti, Strasser, and Vega (2010) examine which qualities of the data and
announcements determine the relevance of particular economic releases to financial markets.
Specifically, they assess how timeliness, precision, and intrinsic value affect the significance of
the effect of economic news on asset prices. Timeliness refers to the median reporting lag1.
Precision is a gauge of how closely the initial release mirrors later revisions. Intrinsic value is a
measure of the correlation between individual macroeconomic variables and the state of the
economy.
This paper extends the literature in three respects. 1) It improves upon the previous
measure of standardized surprise. 2) It examines the symmetry of market reactions to positive
and negative news. 3) It evaluates the relationship between forecast uncertainty and the effect of
surprises in economic news.
Research Design and Methods
Measuring Surprise
Before models can be specified, a measure of surprise must be defined. Standardized
surprise is used in Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001), Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega
(2003), and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2007). It refers to the surprise divided by
the sample standard deviation. !!! is a matrix representing the standardized surprise associated
with indicator ! at time !. Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2007) define standardized
surprise for indicator ! at time ! as !!" =

!!" !!!"
!!

. !!" denotes the announced value of indicator

! at time !. !!" refers to the market’s expectation (forecast value) of indicator ! at time !, and !!
is the sample standard deviation of the surprise component, !!" − !!" . Because !! is constant for
each indicator !, this standardization does not affect the statistical significance of the estimated
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
Reporting lag is the time between the end of the reference period (e.g. end of the month or
quarter) and the release of the actual indicator value.
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response coefficients or the fit of the regressions compared to the results based on the ‘raw’
surprises. As stated earlier, standardization allows for coefficients to be compared across
indicators. Furthermore, it accounts for forecast accuracy, thus making !!" surprise rather than
forecast error. Hence, when !!" = 1, a “normal” surprise occurred for indicator ! at time !.
When !!" < 1, a less than “normal” surprise occurred for indicator ! at time !. Finally, when
!!" > 1, a greater than “normal” surprise occurred for indicator ! at time !. “Normal” is placed
in quotes because though here !!" − !!" is divided by !! , !!" − !!" could also have been
divided by any multiple of !! (e.g. 2!! or 3!! ).
Though the variable !!" is a potentially useful representation of surprise, by itself it may
not be the best representation. Hypothetically, if the actual GDP growth reported was 1% and the
forecasted GDP growth was 2%, the unstandardized surprise (!!" − !!" ) would equal -1%.
Furthermore, if the actual GDP growth rate reported was 9% and the expected GDP growth rate
was 10%, the unstandardized surprise would also equal -1%. It is obvious, however, that markets
would likely react differently to these surprises.
Ideally, a proportional measure of surprise would replace !!" or would be added in
addition to !!" . Unstandardized surprise would be specified as

!!" !!!"
!!"

rather than !!" − !!" ,

as in !!" . However, given that for certain indicators, !, there exists an !!" = 0 value, this
alternative cannot be employed. Instead, the interaction of surprise, !!" , and the forecast value,
!!" , is incorporated into each model. The right-hand side of each model begins with the
expression in Equation (1).
(1)

!! + !! !!" + !! !!" + !! !!" !!"
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Table 1: Equation (1) Variable Descriptions
Variable Description
Standardized Surprise
!!"
Forecast Variable
!!"
Interaction of Surprise and Forecast
!!" !!"
As shown in Table 2 and Table 32, when !! and !! have opposite signs, the greater !!" , the
lesser the effect of !!" ; the lesser !!" , the greater the effect of !!" . When !! and !! share the
same sign, the greater !!" , the greater the effect of !!" ; the lesser !!" , the lesser the effect of !!" .
Table 2: Overall Sign for Surprise Term when !! is Positive
S (+)
S (-)

(+)
(-)

Table 3: Overall Sign for Interaction Term when !! is Negative
F (+)
F (-)
S (+)
(-)
(+)
S (-)
(+)
(-)
Models
This paper evaluates three aspects of the relationship between economic announcements
and stock prices. Consequently, three models are employed. The first model, specified in
Equation (2), measures the impact of economic surprises on stock indices.
(2)

!!" !!!(!!!)
!!(!!!)

= !! + !! !!" + !! !!" + !! !!" !!" + !! !! + !! !!" + !! !! + !! !! + !! !! + !!
Table 4: Equation (2) Variable Descriptions
Variable Description
Stock Index Value
!!"
Volatility
!!
Weekday Dummy
!!"
Recession Dummy
!!
FOMC Statements Dummy
!!
FOMC Minutes Dummy
!!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2
Table 2 and Table 3 display the overall sign of the coefficient multiplied with the variable(s).
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!!" is the index value of stock index ! at the end of trading day !, and !!(!!!) is the index value of
stock index ! at the end of trading day ! − 1. !! is a measure of volatility. The Chicago Board
Options Exchange’s (CBOE) VIX (S&P 500), VXD (Dow Jones Industrial Average), and VXN
(NASDAQ 100) are employed when running regressions against their corresponding stock
indices. (The VXN is used though it is actually regressed against the NASDAQ Composite rather
than the NASDAQ 100.)
!!" is a dummy variable for the day of the week. Gibbons and Hess (1981) find day-ofthe-week effects on assets3. !! is a dummy variable for Great Recession effects. !! is included to
account for any broad changes in market behavior that may have resulted from the Great
Recession. !! = 1 for all days ! between September 15, 2008 and September 20, 2010;
otherwise, !! = 0. September 15, 2008 is the date Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection; this marked the beginning of a dramatic drop in stock prices. It can be
argued that this date marks the day markets first understood a significant recession was
imminent. September 20, 2010 is the date the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
announced that the recession had ended in June of 2010. September 20th was chosen rather than a
date in June because even in September the markets had serious doubts about the strength of the
economy. In particular, there was considerable concern about a possible double-dip recession. !!
is a dummy variable denoting days that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) released
statements. !! = 1 for all release dates; otherwise, !! = 0. !! is a dummy variable indicating
days that the minutes of the FOMC were released. !! = 1 for all release dates; otherwise,
!! = 0. !! is the error term at time !.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3
Inclusion of this dummy precludes the study of weekly economic releases (e.g. initial jobless
claims).
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The second model is specified in Equation (3). The model tests whether or not the
magnitude of stock market responses are symmetric for positive and negative surprises. This
model is similar to Equation (2) except it !!" and !!" replace !!" . !!" contains only the positive
surprises of indicator ! at time !. Negative surprises are assigned a zero value for !!" . !!"
includes only the negative surprises of indicator ! at time !. Positive surprises are assigned a
zero value for !!" . If markets are risk-neutral, the difference between !! and !! should be
statistically insignificant.
(3)

!!" !!! !!!
!! !!!

= !! + !! !!" + !! !!" + !! !!" + !! !!" !!" + !! !! + !! !!" + !! !! + !! !! +

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !! + !!
Table 5: Equation (3) Variable Descriptions
Variable Description
Positive Surprises
!!"
Negative Surprises
!!"
The third model is specified in Equation (4). This model tests the relationship between
forecast uncertainty and the effect of surprises in macroeconomic announcements on stock
indices. It evaluates the question: if surprises affect stock prices, how does market forecast
uncertainty affect the magnitude of the effect of surprises in economic data on stock prices? This
model is similar to Equation (2) except !!" and !!" !!" are added. !!" is a standardized measure
of forecast uncertainty. Similar to !!" , !!" is defined as !!" =

!!" !!!!
!!

. !!" is the survey high

value, and !!" is the survey low value. !! is the sample standard deviation of !!" − !!" . Though
this is a flawed measure of forecast uncertainty and a better measure would be strongly preferred,
this measure was chosen due to data limitations. (Ideally, the variance of the forecast survey
responses for each indicator at time ! would have been used for !!" .)
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(4)

!!" !!!(!!!)
!!(!!!)

= !! + !! !!" + !! !!" + !! !!" !!" + !! !!" + !! !!" !!" + !! !! + !! !!" + !! !! +

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !! + !!" !! + !!
Table 6: Equation (4) Variable Descriptions
Variable Description
Standardized Uncertainty
!!"
Interaction of Surprise and Uncertainty
!!" !!"
Indicators
The models consider nine economic indicators: the CPI, nonfarm payroll employment,
industrial production (IP), ISM manufacturing (NAPM), real annualized gross domestic product
(GDP)4, new home sales, retail sales, personal consumption, and durable goods. Descriptions of
the indicators are in Table 7. Most of these variables span the work of Pearce and Roley (1985),
Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986), Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001), and Gilbert, Scotti, Strasser,
and Vega (2010). They have been repeatedly studied because each of their releases are believed
to trigger a market reaction and are heavily covered by financial media. This reaction stems from
the timeliness, precision, and intrinsic value of each indicator. (Recall that intrinsic value is a
measure of the correlation between individual macroeconomic variables and the state of the
economy.)
Table 7: Full Indicator Descriptions
Full Description
CPI Urban Consumers Less Food & Energy YoY % Change NSA
Nonfarm Payrolls Total MoM Net Change in 000s SA
Industrial Production MoM % Change 2007=100 SA
ISM Manufacturing PMI SA
GDP Chained 2009 Dollars QoQ % Change SAAR – Advanced Release Only
New Single Family Houses Sold Annual Total in 000s SAAR
Adjusted Retail & Food Services Sales MoM % Change SA
Personal Consumption Expenditures Nominal Dollars MoM % Change SA
Durable Goods New Orders Industries MoM % Change SA
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4
Only the advanced release will be studied.
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Data
Most of the literature on effects of economic announcements uses data from Money
Market Services (MMS). This paper will use forecast survey data from Bloomberg. This data
was also used by Gilbert, Scotti, Strasser, and Vega (2010). The data are available on Bloomberg
for all of the indicators noted above beginning in January 2004. Hence, the study is conducted
for releases that occurred between January 1st, 2004 and December 31st, 2013. It is important to
note that for the regressions, dates without releases were excluded from the sample. This
produced a sample of 816 days over the 10-year period. Furthermore, for each indicator,
observations on non-release dates are assigned zero values. Data for the stock prices are taken
from the major stock indices: the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the NASDAQ Composite, and
the S&P 500. Initially, the percent change in the indices from open to close on release days was
to be used. However, because eight of the nine indicators are announced before 9:30 am ET,
when the markets open, the percent change in the indices from close on the previous trading day
to close on the release date is employed. This ensures that any market reaction is accounted for in
the change in the stock indices. (The FTSE 100 was also studied but was found to be less
responsive to US data.) Summary statistics are available in Tables 8 through 11.
Results
Model 1: Surprise
For each model, three regressions were estimated, one for each of the most commonly
followed indices: the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the NASDAQ Composite, and the S&P
500. Regression results for Model 1 are presented in Tables 12 through 17. Beginning with the
control variables, only the constant (!! ), the recession dummy (!! ), the FOMC statement dates
(!! ), and the volatility indices (!! ) are of any significance. Interestingly, !! has a positive
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coefficient. Intuitively, this does not necessarily make sense. However, during this period, the
mean percent change for each stock index on days the indices grew (Dow: 0.7148%, NASDAQ:
0.8284%, and S&P: 0.7269%) is higher than the same measure for the rest of the sample period
(Dow: 0.6481%, NASDAQ: 0.8069%, and S&P: 0.6538%). Furthermore, with the exception of
the S&P 500, the recession period had a higher proportion of days with positive changes (Dow:
55.56%, NASDAQ: 58.02%, and S&P: 54.32%) than the non-recession period (Dow: 55.35%,
NASDAQ: 57.03%, and S&P: 58.41%). The FOMC statement dummy is only significant for the
NASDAQ Composite, though it would be significant for the S&P 500 at the 6% confidence
level. In both instances it is positive and translates to roughly a 0.5% increase in the stock index.
Finally, volatility is always significant at the 0.1% confidence level. Across the board, a one-unit
increase in volatility leads to roughly a .05% decrease in stock index growth.
With regard to !!" , !!" , and !!" !!" , mysteriously !!" is significant for employment and
personal consumption expenditure in each regression and for ISM Manufacturing for the
NASDAQ Composite regression. It is difficult to conceive of a theoretical justification for this.
Theoretically, stock prices immediately incorporate all available relevant information. Hence, it
does not make sense that the forecast value by itself, which had been previously released, would
affect stock index growth on the indicator announcement date. It is also difficult to interpret
!!" !!" for employment. Given both !!" and !!" can be either positive or negative, the
interaction,!!!" !!" , by itself has no clear meaning. The final puzzling Model 1 result is the
significant, negative coefficient for surprise for IP. This implies that positive surprises in IP
decreased stock index growth.
More in line with expectations, !!" had significant, positive coefficients for retail sales
and personal consumption across the three regressions. Additionally, !!" !!" had a significant,
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negative coefficient for retail sales. This means that the positive effects of positive surprises in
retail sales were tempered by the magnitude of the forecast value. (This is an example of the
interaction of surprise and the forecast value mimicking the behavior of a proportional surprise
variable.) The results for retail sales and personal consumption are robust because they are
consistent across the three regressions.
At the 10% confidence level, surprises in durable goods also become significant across
the three regressions. (At the 5% confidence level, surprises in durable goods are only significant
when regressed against the Dow Jones Industrial Average.) At the 15% confidence level,
surprises in GDP become significant for all three regressions as well. At the 5% confidence
level, surprise in GDP is only significant when regressed against the NASDAQ Composite. The
interaction of surprise and the forecast value is always significant for GDP at the 5% confidence
level. While the interpretation of the interaction coefficient is straightforward when surprise is
also significant, the coefficient is more difficult to understand on its own, as is the case for two
of the three regressions.
Model 2: Positive vs. Negative Surprise
The Model 2 regression results are similar to those of Model 1. Therefore, analysis of
these results will focus exclusively on the positive and negative surprise coefficients. Regression
results for Model 2 are displayed in Tables 18 through 23. Consistent throughout the three
regressions, only negative surprises in IP are significant at the 5% confidence level, and only
positive surprises in GDP are significant at the 10% confidence level. Hence, IP and GDP
provide evidence that for at least some indicators, the markets react asymmetrically to positive
and negative surprises. Retail sales and personal consumption provide evidence to the contrary.
At the 6% confidence level, both positive and negative surprises in retail sales and personal
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consumption are significant. (At the 5% confidence level, positive surprises in retail sales and
personal consumption are not statistically significant when regressed against the S&P 500.)
Overall, the results suggest that whether or not markets react symmetrically to positive
and negative surprises depends on the specific indicator. Thus, markets are not perfectly rational.
As stated previously, perfectly rational markets would be risk-neutral and would consistently
react symmetrically to positive and negative surprises.
Model 3: Uncertainty
The measure of forecast uncertainty employed in Model 3 is very weak. As stated when
specifying the model, it was used for lack of a better measure. As a result, Model 3 regression
results suggest little if any relationship between forecast uncertainty and changes in stock prices.
Regression results for Model 3 are presented in Tables 24 through 29. Though it is possible that
this is actually the case, given how crude !!" is, it is improper to make any conclusions based on
these results. Ideally, the variance of the forecast survey responses for each indicator at time !
would have been used for !!" .
Conclusion
This paper aims to answer three questions. Do surprises in economic data affect stock
prices? If there is an effect, is the magnitude of that effect symmetrical for positive and negative
surprises? Finally, if surprises affect stock prices, how does market forecast uncertainty affect
the magnitude of the effect of surprises in economic data on stock prices? This paper robustly
shows that surprise in retail sales and personal consumption affect stock prices. Interestingly, it
presents no evidence that surprises in nonfarm employment affect stock prices and only weak
evidence of surprises in GDP affecting stock prices. This paper offers credible support for the
notion that the market is not always perfectly rational; the markets reacted asymmetrically to
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positive and negative surprises of some indicators (Industrial Production [IP] and Gross
Domestic Product [GDP]). Finally, the paper concludes that given how crude !!" is, it is
improper to make any conclusions regarding forecasting uncertainty based on Model 3
regression results.
There are three possible explanations as to why financial media cover macroeconomic
data releases so heavily while this paper’s results suggest markets only react to a few of the
indicators. 1) Surprises only have a limited effect on stock prices, and the media attention is a
result of politicization of macroeconomic data, especially during times of economic uncertainty.
2) Surprises only affect prices for behavioral reasons. For example, it may be that investors know
other investors will react to the surprise, so they react as well. This leads to an immediate change
in stock prices following the announcement, but later in the day, investors return to their presurprise valuations. In this example, the media might cover the release because they anticipate a
significant initial adjustment. 3) Surprises may have a significant impact on prices, but that effect
may be muffled by the many other factors affecting prices. Given that the dependent variable is
percent change between close of the previous trading day and close of the announcement date
and given that all of the announcements occur by 10:00 am ET, many other factors are
influencing prices in the six hours between the last release and the market close at 4:00 pm ET.
To address this possibility, intra-day price data would be necessary.
In the future, this paper could be extended in three ways. First, intra-day price data could
be introduced. Second, a longer sample period could be studied. (The current sample period was
chosen because Bloomberg survey data first became consistent for these indicators at the
beginning of the sample, just before January 2004.) If revisited in the future, the sample could be
expanded to include the new data. Finally, additional controls could be added to the models.

14

Ideally, the models would control for every factor that influences the stock market. Practically
speaking, though not everything can be controlled for, additions can be made to the current
controls (e.g. a Hurricane Katrina dummy, a presidential election result dummy, a Libyan
intervention dummy, etc.).
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Table 8: Summary Statistics - Indicators
Description
Mean
Max
Min
CPI YoY NSA (%)
1.920
2.900
0.600
Nonfarm Payrolls MoM SA (000s)
51.233
431.000 -663.000
IP MoM 2007=100 SA (%)
0.150
1.300
-2.800
ISM Manufacturing PMI SA
53.293
66.200
32.400
GDP Chained 2009 Dollars QoQ SAAR (%)
2.163
5.600
-6.300
New Home Sales (000s)
675.600 1431.000 250.000
Retail Sales SA Total MoM Change (%)
0.263
2.700
-2.800
Personal Consumption MoM SA (%)
0.321
1.300
-1.000
Durable Goods MoM SA (%)
0.097
9.900 -13.200
Table 9: Summary Statistics - Variables
Description
Mean S Max S Min S
CPI YoY NSA (%)
-0.027 3.290 -2.194
Nonfarm Payrolls MoM SA (000s)
-0.169 2.626 -2.905
IP MoM 2007=100 SA (%)
-0.158 2.653 -4.823
ISM Manufacturing PMI SA
0.154 3.727 -3.022
GDP Chained 2009 Dollars QoQ SAAR (%)
-0.179 1.886 -2.264
New Home Sales (000s)
0.005 3.848 -2.618
Retail Sales SA Total MoM Change (%)
0.016 3.528 -2.940
Personal Consumption MoM SA (%)
-0.033 2.609 -3.914
Durable Goods MoM SA (%)
-0.087 2.522 -3.505

Mean A-E S=15
-0.003 0.091
-12.113 71.596
-0.065 0.415
0.305 1.986
-0.048 0.265
0.341 63.410
0.008 0.510
-0.005 0.153
-0.203 2.339
Mean H-L
0.327
179.742
1.112
5.017
0.738
107.120
1.508
0.703
6.489

n
120
120
120
120
40
120
120
120
120

Mean U
0.878
2.397
2.150
3.161
1.934
0.915
1.847
2.579
2.820

Table 10: Summary Statistics – Stock Indices (1/1/04 – 12/31/13)6
Description
Mean
Median
Max
Min
Dow Jones Industrial Average 0.0253% 0.0478% 11.0803% -7.8733%
NASDAQ Composite
0.0388% 0.0887% 11.8059% -9.1424%
S&P 500
0.0285% 0.0750% 11.5800% -9.0350%
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
The “S=1” column in Table 4 represents the !!" − !!" value that equates to !!" = 1. This is the magnitude of a “normal” surprise.
6
Table 6 displays the summary statistics for every day between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2013. It is not limited to the
sample observations.
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Table 11: Summary Statistics – Stock Indices (Sample Observations Only)
Description
Mean
Median
Max
Min
Dow Jones Industrial Average 0.0410% 0.1049% 4.6789% -7.8733%
NASDAQ Composite
0.0544% 0.1440% 5.4891% -9.1424%
S&P 500
0.0385% 0.1201% 5.1360% -9.0350%
Table 12: Model 1: Dow Jones Industrial Average Regression Results - Controls
Adjusted R2 = 0.129
Coefficient7 Sig.
Constant
0.749† 0.000
W: Tuesday
0.055 0.711
W: Wednesday
0.122 0.395
W: Thursday
0.025 0.861
W: Friday
0.109 0.406
R: Lehman – NBER
0.240† 0.044
C: FOMC Statements
0.261 0.233
M: FOMC Minutes
-0.208 0.366
V: Volatility (VXD)
-0.044† 0.000
Table 13: Model 1: Dow Jones Industrial Average Regression Results – Independent Variables
Surprise
Forecast
Surprise*Forecast
Coefficient
Sig.
Coefficient
Sig.
Coefficient
Sig.
CPI
-0.016
0.963
0.011
0.845
0.023
0.898
Employment
0.100
0.319
-0.002†
0.000
0.001†
0.006
IP
-0.196†
0.049
-0.317
0.176
0.641†
0.001
ISM Manufacturing
-1.122
0.214
0.004
0.076
0.023
0.186
GDP (Advanced)
0.412
0.109
0.004
0.949
-0.164†
0.024
New Home Sales
-0.081
0.816
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.945
Retail Sales
0.361†
0.000
0.013
0.927
-0.294†
0.016
Personal Consumption
0.387†
0.006
-0.602†
0.011
-0.294
0.359
Durable Goods
0.224†
0.038
-0.090
0.096
0.013
0.752
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7
Bolding and a † is used to denote significance at the .05 significance level.
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Table 14: Model 1: NASDAQ Composite Regression Results - Controls
Adjusted R2 = 0.142
Coefficient Sig.
Constant
0.961† 0.000
W: Tuesday
0.164 0.373
W: Wednesday
0.267 0.130
W: Thursday
0.175 0.320
W: Friday
0.274 0.090
R: Lehman – NBER
0.278† 0.050
C: FOMC Statements
0.585† 0.030
M: FOMC Minutes
-0.169 0.550
V: Volatility (VXN)
-0.052† 0.000
Table 15: Model 1: NASDAQ Composite Regression Results – Independent Variables
Surprise
Forecast
Surprise*Forecast
Coefficient
Sig.
Coefficient
Sig.
Coefficient
Sig.
CPI
-0.402
0.338
-0.014
0.842
0.245
0.262
Employment
0.072
0.559
-0.002†
0.001
0.002†
0.002
IP
-0.290†
0.018
-0.069
0.809
0.775†
0.001
ISM Manufacturing
-0.396
0.721
0.006†
0.039
0.010
0.617
GDP (Advanced)
0.731†
0.020
0.043
0.550
-0.247†
0.006
New Home Sales
-0.074
0.863
0.000
0.390
0.000
0.943
Retail Sales
0.412†
0.001
-0.025
0.889
-0.430†
0.004
Personal Consumption
0.483†
0.006
-0.761†
0.009
-0.257
0.515
Durable Goods
0.219
0.098
-0.126
0.058
0.038
0.440
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Table 16: Model 1: S&P 500 Regression Results - Controls
Adjusted R2 = 0.135
Coefficient Sig.
Constant
0.832† 0.000
W: Tuesday
0.099 0.548
W: Wednesday
0.169 0.287
W: Thursday
0.098 0.534
W: Friday
0.191 0.188
R: Lehman – NBER
0.310† 0.020
C: FOMC Statements
0.456 0.059
M: FOMC Minutes
-0.168 0.506
V: Volatility (VIX)
-0.048† 0.000
Table 17: Model 1: S&P 500 Regression Results – Independent Variables
Surprise
Forecast
Surprise*Forecast
Coefficient
Sig.
Coefficient
Sig.
Coefficient
Sig.
CPI
-0.162
0.666
-0.013
0.841
0.113
0.563
Employment
0.050
0.655
-0.002†
0.000
0.001†
0.007
IP
-0.199
0.070
-0.255
0.324
0.623†
0.003
ISM Manufacturing
-0.725
0.467
0.004
0.073
0.016
0.396
GDP (Advanced)
0.442
0.118
-0.005
0.940
-0.164†
0.041
New Home Sales
-0.025
0.947
0.000
0.991
0.000
0.899
Retail Sales
0.378†
0.001
-0.026
0.873
-0.358†
0.008
Personal Consumption
0.409†
0.009
-0.652†
0.012
-0.279
0.431
Durable Goods
0.213
0.074
-0.103
0.084
0.025
0.577
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Table 18: Model 2: Dow Jones Industrial Average Regression Results - Controls
Adjusted R2 = 0.129
Coefficient Sig.
Constant
0.724† 0.000
W: Tuesday
0.073 0.629
W: Wednesday
0.124 0.400
W: Thursday
0.039 0.789
W: Friday
0.080 0.562
R: Lehman – NBER
0.251† 0.038
C: FOMC Statements
0.276 0.212
M: FOMC Minutes
-0.196 0.397
V: Volatility (VXD)
-0.045† 0.000
Table 19: Model 2: Dow Jones Industrial Average Regression Results – Independent Variables
CPI
Employment
IP
ISM Manufacturing
GDP (Advanced)
New Home Sales
Retail Sales
Personal Consumption
Durable Goods

Positive Surprise
Negative Surprise
Forecast
Surprise*Forecast
Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. Coefficient
Sig. Coefficient Sig.
-0.021 0.951
0.154 0.736
0.041 0.583
-0.019 0.921
0.250 0.144
-0.022 0.881
-0.002† 0.000
0.001† 0.004
0.044 0.847
-0.301† 0.024
-0.443 0.093
0.490† 0.032
-1.243 0.176
-1.113 0.226
0.005 0.090
0.024 0.167
0.532 0.078
0.199 0.645
-0.014 0.839
-0.133 0.147
-0.159 0.697
-0.058 0.875
0.000 0.829
0.000 0.891
0.300† 0.046
0.419† 0.005
0.043 0.774
-0.273† 0.028
0.527† 0.035
0.323† 0.042
-0.670† 0.016
-0.382 0.283
0.317 0.091
0.154 0.340
-0.089 0.102
-0.004 0.936
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Table 20: Model 2: NASDAQ Composite Regression Results - Controls
Adjusted R2 = 0.129
Coefficient Sig.
Constant
0.923† 0.000
W: Tuesday
0.178 0.338
W: Wednesday
0.251 0.165
W: Thursday
0.171 0.339
W: Friday
0.210 0.213
R: Lehman – NBER
0.280 0.053
C: FOMC Statements
0.606† 0.026
M: FOMC Minutes
-0.156 0.584
V: Volatility (VXN)
-0.054† 0.000
Table 21: Model 2: NASDAQ Composite Regression Results – Independent Variables
Positive Surprise
Coefficient Sig.
CPI
Employment
IP
ISM Manufacturing
GDP (Advanced)
New Home Sales
Retail Sales
Personal Consumption
Durable Goods

-0.411
0.357
-0.004
-0.522
0.855†
-0.246
0.427†
0.652†
0.416

0.328
0.090
0.988
0.644
0.021
0.623
0.021
0.033
0.071

Negative Surprise
Coefficient Sig.
-0.372
-0.162
-0.427†
-0.432
0.628
-0.039
0.384†
0.393†
0.063

0.506
0.376
0.009
0.702
0.237
0.932
0.038
0.044
0.750

Forecast
Coefficient
Sig.
0.014
-0.002†
-0.182
0.007
0.045
0.000
-0.005
-0.805†
-0.126

0.882
0.001
0.572
0.056
0.604
0.343
0.976
0.019
0.059

Surprise*Forecast
Coefficient Sig.
0.243
0.002†
0.615†
0.012
-0.240†
0.000
-0.424†
-0.352
0.009

0.311
0.001
0.028
0.569
0.033
0.941
0.005
0.420
0.883
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Table 22: Model 2: S&P 500 Regression Results - Controls
Adjusted R2 = 0.129
Coefficient Sig.
Constant
0.808† 0.000
W: Tuesday
0.116 0.487
W: Wednesday
0.162 0.318
W: Thursday
0.105 0.515
W: Friday
0.153 0.311
R: Lehman – NBER
0.317† 0.019
C: FOMC Statements
0.470 0.054
M: FOMC Minutes
-0.156 0.543
V: Volatility (VIX)
-0.049† 0.000
Table 23: Model 2: S&P 500 Regression Results – Independent Variables
Positive Surprise
Coefficient Sig.
CPI
Employment
IP
ISM Manufacturing
GDP (Advanced)
New Home Sales
Retail Sales
Personal Consumption
Durable Goods

-0.169
0.220
0.060
-0.804
0.561
-0.138
0.316
0.517
0.356

0.654
0.245
0.811
0.428
0.092
0.760
0.057
0.060
0.085

Negative Surprise
Coefficient Sig.
-0.025
-0.089
-0.314†
-0.748
0.255
-0.005
0.435†
0.355†
0.105

0.960
0.588
0.032
0.461
0.593
0.989
0.009
0.043
0.556

Forecast
Coefficient
Sig.
0.015
-0.002†
-0.387
0.005
-0.019
0.000
0.004
-0.688†
-0.104

0.861
0.000
0.183
0.124
0.809
0.832
0.981
0.025
0.085

Surprise*Forecast
Coefficient Sig.
0.080
0.001†
0.463
0.017
-0.138
0.000
-0.337†
-0.341
0.001

0.711
0.004
0.065
0.370
0.173
0.984
0.014
0.385
0.989
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Table 24: Model 3: Dow Jones Industrial Average Regression Results - Controls
Adjusted R2 = 0.135
Coefficient Sig.
Constant
0.724† 0.000
W: Tuesday
0.042 0.780
W: Wednesday
0.078 0.602
W: Thursday
-0.020 0.891
W: Friday
0.023 0.874
R: Lehman – NBER
0.219 0.072
C: FOMC Statements
0.265 0.231
M: FOMC Minutes
-0.252 0.280
V: Volatility (VXD)
-0.043† 0.000
Table 25: Model 3: Dow Jones Industrial Average Regression Results – Independent Variables
CPI
Employment
IP
ISM Manufacturing
GDP (Advanced)
New Home Sales
Retail Sales
Personal Consumption
Durable Goods

Surprise
Coefficient Sig.
-0.084 0.817
0.035 0.898
0.971† 0.003
-1.068 0.288
0.187 0.750
-0.057 0.876
0.226 0.369
0.918† 0.007
0.226 0.504

Forecast
Coefficient Sig.
-0.004 0.960
-0.002† 0.000
-0.365 0.139
0.003 0.628
-0.019 0.800
0.000 0.703
0.024 0.873
-0.686† 0.020
-0.088 0.147

Surprise*Forecast
Coefficient Sig.
0.056 0.766
0.001† 0.004
-0.279 0.372
0.025 0.149
-0.138 0.116
0.000 0.820
-0.228 0.155
-0.440 0.186
0.001 0.986

Uncertainty
Coefficient Sig.
0.038 0.731
0.064 0.271
0.080 0.165
0.020 0.825
0.098 0.418
0.096 0.598
-0.012 0.851
0.066 0.213
0.025 0.615

Surprise*Uncertainty
Coefficient
Sig.
-0.001
0.988
0.030
0.769
-0.372†
0.000
-0.065
0.513
0.085
0.722
-0.070
0.701
0.055
0.583
-0.179
0.099
0.000
0.999
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Table 26: Model 3: NASDAQ Composite Regression Results - Controls
Adjusted R2 = 0.151
Coefficient Sig.
Constant
0.919† 0.000
W: Tuesday
0.143 0.441
W: Wednesday
0.216 0.239
W: Thursday
0.131 0.475
W: Friday
0.168 0.334
R: Lehman – NBER
0.213 0.141
C: FOMC Statements
0.613† 0.024
M: FOMC Minutes
-0.218 0.447
V: Volatility (VXN)
-0.053† 0.000
Table 27: Model 3: NASDAQ Composite Regression Results – Independent Variables
CPI
Employment
IP
ISM Manufacturing
GDP (Advanced)
New Home Sales
Retail Sales
Personal Consumption
Durable Goods

Surprise
Coefficient Sig.
-0.689 0.123
0.148 0.657
0.954† 0.016
-0.617 0.616
0.693 0.335
-0.085 0.849
0.032 0.917
1.240† 0.003
0.421 0.310

Forecast
Coefficient Sig.
-0.071 0.460
-0.002† 0.001
-0.107 0.723
0.003 0.667
0.048 0.597
0.000 0.960
-0.063 0.732
-1.061† 0.003
-0.107 0.147

Surprise*Forecast
Coefficient Sig.
0.345 0.133
0.002† 0.002
-0.182 0.635
0.018 0.392
-0.258† 0.016
0.000 0.984
-0.264 0.178
-0.529 0.194
0.005 0.936

Uncertainty
Coefficient Sig.
0.216 0.110
0.085 0.229
0.095 0.183
0.059 0.604
0.061 0.679
0.147 0.512
0.060 0.434
0.150† 0.021
0.045 0.455

Surprise*Uncertainty
Coefficient
Sig.
0.084
0.298
-0.029
0.813
-0.395†
0.001
-0.068
0.578
0.041
0.889
-0.033
0.883
0.163
0.186
-0.245
0.065
-0.068
0.611
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Table 28: Model 3: S&P 500 Regression Results - Controls
Adjusted R2 = 0.138
Coefficient Sig.
Constant
0.785† 0.000
W: Tuesday
0.082 0.623
W: Wednesday
0.125 0.449
W: Thursday
0.057 0.729
W: Friday
0.099 0.528
R: Lehman – NBER
0.274† 0.044
C: FOMC Statements
0.469 0.055
M: FOMC Minutes
-0.220 0.393
V: Volatility (VIX)
-0.048† 0.000
Table 29: Model 3: S&P 500 Regression Results – Independent Variables
CPI
Employment
IP
ISM Manufacturing
GDP (Advanced)
New Home Sales
Retail Sales
Personal Consumption
Durable Goods

Surprise
Coefficient Sig.
-0.311 0.440
-0.041 0.890
0.964† 0.007
-0.731 0.510
0.409 0.528
-0.003 0.995
0.229 0.411
1.063† 0.004
0.260 0.487

Forecast
Coefficient Sig.
-0.042 0.628
-0.002† 0.000
-0.317 0.244
0.004 0.522
-0.021 0.795
0.000 0.769
-0.018 0.912
-0.776† 0.017
-0.097 0.146

Surprise*Forecast
Coefficient Sig.
0.166 0.422
0.001† 0.005
-0.312 0.367
0.020 0.313
-0.150 0.120
0.000 0.948
-0.289 0.102
-0.465 0.206
0.010 0.864

Uncertainty
Coefficient Sig.
0.091 0.453
0.072 0.262
0.102 0.110
0.012 0.903
0.091 0.495
0.101 0.618
0.008 0.909
0.090 0.122
0.032 0.552

Surprise*Uncertainty
Coefficient
Sig.
0.036
0.621
0.039
0.727
-0.368†
0.001
-0.061
0.582
0.003
0.990
-0.082
0.684
0.062
0.575
-0.219
0.067
-0.015
0.899
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